













 Scientific “truths” provide the underpinnings of 
forensic science. Generally, scientific fact is proven based 
upon accepted scientific method in the particular field. Legal 
“truths” sometimes depend upon scientific truth to prove or 
disprove a fact in issue but legal truths are not established 
merely by the exercise of scientific method.  Legal truths 
derive from the processes of the adversary system. The legal 
selection criteria utilized in picking and choosing what is and 
is not legitimate forensic proof in the eyes of the law rests on 
the rules of evidence and established case precedent. As 
technology advances and the interdisciplinary fields of study 
expand to redefine the boundaries of scientific truth, the law 
must continually re-evaluate those techniques accepted as 
reliable and others cast aside under the rubric of “junk 




                                                 
*
 Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Roundtable Symposium 
Law Journal, Southern New England School of Law.  The author wishes 
to thank Thomas Cleary, Editor-in-Chief, and Nicole Norvekicius,  
Managing Editor, and the law review staff for their incredible hard work 
and commitment to this project and to the future of this law journal.  A 
special thanks to Dean Ward and the faculty at the Southern New England 
School of Law for their support and continuing participation in the law 
journal. Many thanks to Lois Kane, retired librarian, and Annette Cain, 
faculty secretary, for their assistance in so many aspects of this project. 
Finally, thanks to Aaron Weismann, Technical Advisor, Washington 
University School of Law in St. Louis, for editorial and formatting 
assistance.  
1
 David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders, 
and Edward K. Cheng, Modern Scientific Evidence: Forensics 4-5 (2006). 
2 Trends and Issues in Scientific Evidence       Vol. 1 
 
 Legal educators increasingly use the classroom to 
import expertise from scientists and social scientists to better 
prepare law students to engage in specialized and 
collaborative fields of practice.
2
 Indeed, this project grew out 
of a paper course on Scientific Evidence in Civil and 
Criminal Cases offered during the spring 2006 semester at the 
law school.  Students heard from accident reconstruction 
experts, DNA scientists, forensic pathologists and medical 
malpractice experts.  In February 2006, Dr. Aaron Lazare, 
Dean and Chancellor at the University of Massachusetts, 
addressed the law school on a cutting-edge legal theory from 
his recently published book, “On Apology.”
3
 Stimulated by 
this flow of information from scientists and social scientists, 
the journal staff invited articles from various scientific and 
non-scientific disciplines in an effort to identify new forensic 




              The boundaries of the law in terms of the 
admissibility of expert opinion testimony are fixed, however, 
those boundaries remain as uncertain in application as the 
underlying principles of science and technology that inform a 
court’s decisions. The hallmark of admissibility of expert 
witness testimony, under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,
5
 requires that the opinion be the “product of 
reliable principles and methods.”  Rule 702 was subsequently 
amended in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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 The call for articles is also directed to law students.  It is part of the 
mission of the journal to promote a scholarly dialogue that includes a 
venue for gifted future lawyers and educators to weigh in on the issues. 
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
6
 and to the 
many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael. 
7
  In Daubert, the Supreme Court charged trial 
judges with the responsibility of acting as Agatekeepers@ to 
exclude unreliable scientific testimony, and later, in Kumho 
Tire, the Supreme Court expanded the application of the 
Agatekeeper function@ to non-scientific expert testimony.  
  Daubert provides a non-exclusive checklist for trial 
courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert 
testimony: (1) whether the expert=s technique or theory can 
be or has been tested B that is, whether the expert=s theory 
can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is 
instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot 
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the 
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and 
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the 
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the 
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the 
scientific community.  Consistent with this opinion, the Court 
applied the same factors in Kumho Tire to assess the 
reliability of non-scientific expert testimony, depending upon 
Athe particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.@
8
 
 While the relevant factors for determining reliability 
will vary according to each particular field of expertise, the 
rules of evidence reject the premise that an expert=s 
testimony should be treated more permissively simply 
because it is outside the realm of science.
9
  An opinion from 
an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same 
degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert 
who purports to be a scientist. Some types of expert 
testimony will be more objectively verifiable, and subject to 
the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and publication, 
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than others.  Some types of expert testimony will not rely on 
anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be 
evaluated by reference to other standard principles attendant 
to the particular area of expertise. 
 With these legal standards and limitations in mind, the 
reader should consider whether the theories presented by the 
authors in this journal satisfy the current evidentiary 
standards governing admissibility.  The challenge of applying 
law to science and the inevitable tension between 
interdisciplinary methods gives rise to an important and 
vigorous dialogue…one that we hope is found to be of 
interest within the pages of this journal. 
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GLENN R. SCHMITT- “AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM 9/11: DNA 
IDENTIFICATION IN MASS FATALITY INCIDENTS” 
Glenn R. Schmitt is the Deputy Director and Acting 
Director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). He was 
appointed Deputy Director in 2001. Prior to joining NIJ, Mr. 
Schmitt served as the Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary.  Director 
Schmitt authored a special introduction to the Report of the 
National Institute of Justice for this symposium journal. In his 
introduction, Schmitt emphasizes that although “Lessons 
Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality 
Incidents,” (Report), is designed primarily to help the 
Nation’s crime laboratory directors respond to future mass 
fatality disasters—be they natural disasters, large 
transportation accidents, or terrorist events—a variety of 
issues in the Report concern the intersection of criminal 
justice and forensics, particularly as it relates to using DNA 
analysis to identify victims when other identification methods 
are not enough. The Report is both a compelling story of the 
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recovery of human remains using DNA technology and a 
guide to evidentiary issues involving the admissibility of 
DNA evidence, such as chain of custody and evidence 
preservation, of interest to every practitioner. However, the 
Report goes beyond the more obvious evidentiary issues 
connected to the use and admissibility of DNA evidence and 
includes other major litigation issues attendant to the use of 
DNA scientific evidence including: dealing with the press, 
privacy act considerations, and the use of an advisory panel 
of experts and/or bioethicists.  At the same time, the Report 
underscores the need for the laboratory directors to be ever-
mindful of the potential for civil action. Such litigation could 
arise out of misidentification, release of information, control 
of remains, and intellectual property assertions regarding the 
development of new DNA identification techniques. The 
Report offers guidance regarding the need for a laboratory 
director to work closely with contracting officers and 
attorneys on issues such as contracts, intellectual property 
rights, and privacy issues, including the creation of a next-of-
kin release policy. Director Schmitt provides an excellent 
summary of the legal issues attendant to the courtroom use of 
DNA evidence and the less obvious but equally significant 
risks of litigation attendant to the collection, dissemination 
and use of this scientific evidence. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE-“LESSONS 







 anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, the National Institute of Justice—the 
research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. 
Department of Justice—published a major report on the 
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identification of mass disaster victims using DNA analysis. 
The Report is prepared by the Kinship and Data Analysis 
Panel, a multidisciplinary group of scientists assembled by 
the National Institute of Justice to offer guidance to the New 
York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the 
identification of those who perished in the World Trade 
Center. The Southern New England School of Law is 
privileged to offer this excellent work to its readers and the 
legal and scientific community.  
  
SUSAN LECLAIR AND JAMES GRIFFITH-“DNA IN THE 
COURTROOM” 
 
 Dr. Susan Leclair is a professor of Medical 
Laboratory Science at the University of Massachusetts at 
Dartmouth. Dr. James Griffith is the Chancellor Professor 
and Chairman of the Medical Laboratory Science Department 
at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth. Dr. Griffith 
is also executive director of the University of Massachusetts 
Center for Molecular Diagnostics. He is also an adjunct 
professor at the Southern New England School of Law and 
participated as a guest lecturer in the course offered on 
Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases at the law 
school. 
 The Leclair and Griffith article serves as the perfect 
accompaniment to the NIJ Report.  Here, two renowned 
scientists in the field explain the science behind the scientific 
evidence of DNA.  The article is a must for any practitioner.  
In order to introduce scientific evidence, a lawyer must 
understand the language and method of the science.  In that 
way, the practitioner can act as an intermediary between the 
expert witness and the jury in the presentation of the 
scientific evidence to aid in the resolution of a matter in issue 
at trial.  In the same way, an attorney can only test the 
reliability of the scientific method by first understanding the 
scientific principles that form the basis of the proposed expert 
opinion. 
 Leclair and Griffith deftly navigate the non-scientist 
through the scientific waters of DNA technology, defining its 
uses, limitations and reliability in the courtroom setting. 




Specifically, the article explores the history and development 
of DNA.  Leclair and Griffith then explain the basic structure 
of DNA, methods of inheritance, and the bridges to 
technology or forms of testing.  The testing methods 
discussed include: DNA probe technology, PCR technology, 
and Immunoassay. Testing principles are examined in detail, 
including quantification and analysis. The article then 
connects the testing process to forensic application. After a 
cogent explanation of the forensic uses, Leclair and Griffith 
explore the uses of the forensic evidence in a courtroom and 
consider the differences between reliable DNA evidence and 
the stuff that defines “junk science.”             
 Finally, “professionalism” and the use experts are 
considered in the context of evidence presentation at trial.  
These scientists conclude that the future use of DNA to serve 
the interests of justice turns on its subservience to the legal 
system that dictates the contours of the admissibility of this 
unique scientific evidence. 
 
NASEAM RACHEL BEHOUZFARD-“STRENGTHS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES OF DNA  
EVIDENCE” 
 
 Naseam Behouzfard is a student at the Southern New 
England School of Law and a member of the law review 
staff.  In her article,  Behouzfard examines the historical and 
legal development of the use of DNA evidence in the 
courtroom.  There is particular emphasis on the legal tests 
developed by the courts in ruling on its admissibility at trial 
and the evidentiary pitfalls that can preclude admissibility, 
including chain of custody issues and other possible 
contamination problems. Like the preceding NIJ report, the 
article concludes that use of DNA technology as scientific 
evidence is critical to the investigative and judicial fact 
finding processes, particularly in criminal cases where proof 
of innocence can, in some cases, be conclusively established 
through testing.     
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MATTHEW KOES-“SHELLFISH CONTAMINATION: 
REDUCING THE NECESSITY FOR SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 
NDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT” 
 
 Matthew Koes is an attorney and recent graduate of 
the Southern New England School of Law. In his article, 
Koes examines the problems of using scientific evidence in 
quantifying future damages to shellfish resources caused by 
pollution contamination to the fragile coastal eco-systems. 
Koes examines the benefits of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) over traditional common law remedies as the 
vehicle for compensating the public for damages to natural 
resources caused by industrial contamination. 
 However, a problem arises under CERCLA because 
the ultimate manifestations of hazardous waste pollution are 
unpredictable and long term and the extent of these damages 
cannot be accurately quantified until long after the legal 
dispute is resolved in the courts. Because of the speculative 
nature of the scientific evidence as a predictor of future harm, 
the reliability of its use is frequently called into question.  
The legal conundrum is how to use scientific evidence to 
prove the unpredictable future harms occasioned by industrial 
pollution.  The problem is significant because unknown but 
anticipated future harm, surfacing long after the lawsuit is 
over, may result in an unfair economic burden to the public 
whereas the economic burden should be borne by the 
polluter.   
 The author argues that the evidentiary requirements 
under CERCLA for establishing causation between actual 
known damage and future unknown but anticipated harm 
should be relaxed to ease proof standards consistent with the 
quasi-strict liability standards imposed by Congress on 
certain industries responsible for industrial contamination and 
remediation. To this end, Koes examines the nature of 
scientific evidence and the use of expert testimony in 
CERCLA litigation.  He carefully considers the limitations of 
the federal rules of evidence in light of the decisions in 




Daubert and Kumho Tire, concluding that some courts have 
recognized that environmental litigation requires a special 
application of the rules of evidence to compensate for the 
unpredictable nature of the certain harm caused by industrial 
polluters. Koes then applies that consideration to the 
CERCLA legislative framework. 
 Koes offers a template for utilizing scientific evidence 
to establish a prima facie case under CERCLA.  He explains 
the use of “fingerprinting” sources of pollution and 
contamination over time in a particular coastal region and 
then using the fingerprint as a predictor for future damages.  
Koes demonstrates the reticence of some courts to accept the 
proof while others show a greater willingness to accept the 
reliability of this scientific evidence. 
 Koes underscores the case law finding that calculating 
damages may be an abstract exercise to some degree but the 
value of the nation’s natural resources are also not “fully 
captured by the market system.” Koes thus concludes by 
acknowledging the “awkward partnership” between law and 
science in the area of CERCLA litigation and the need to 
replace the current causation standard with a more workable 
proof standard tied to strict liability.   
 
MATTHEW PILLSBURY-“SAY SORRY AND SAVE: A 
PRACTICAL ARGUMENT FOR A GREATER ROLE FOR 
APOLOGIES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW” 
-WITH A FOREWARD BY ROBERT WARD 
 
 Matthew Pillsbury is an attorney and recent graduate 
and valedictorian (2006) of the Southern New England 
School of Law.  Prior to seeking his law degree, he worked as 
a journalist and writer. In his article, Pillsbury considers more 
than just the restorative effects of an apology by the 
wrongdoer to the victim in a medical malpractice action.  He 
considers the empirical proof which supports the claim that 
an apology reduces the incidence of litigation and/or the size 
and amount of damages awards. The particular evidentiary 
problem examined in the article arises out of the inability to 
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use apology as a means to mitigate damages where the 
statement can later be used as a damaging admission against 
interest in subsequent litigation. 
 Pillsbury examines the novel theory of using apology 
as a means to reduce litigation and damages awards set forth 
in Dr. Aaron Lazare’s recent book, “On Apology.”  The 
skeptic might be surprised to learn from Pillsbury’s article 
that several state legislatures have agreed with the theory and, 
to implement its use, enacted legislation to exclude from 
evidence at trial the use of an apology as a damaging 
admission of liability. Roughly twenty nine states have 
“apology laws” that protect expressions of sympathy or 
sorrow from being used as evidence against the apologizer. In 
fact, Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to enact an 
apology protection law.  Likewise, several court opinions also 
recognize the importance of apology in the field of medical 
malpractice and exclude its use at trial as an admission 
against interest by a party opponent. 
 Pillsbury concludes that the introduction of apology 
as a legal tool has the power to revolutionize medical 
malpractice law.  Robert Ward, Dean at the Southern New 
England School of Law, agrees and in his “Foreword” to the 
article advocates the use of apology as a means to achieving 
damages reform in the hotly debated political arena of 
litigation caps on damages. The practitioner is presented with 
scientific empirical proof supporting this trend in the law.    
 
DENNIS RODERICK AND SUSAN KRUMHOLZ-“MUCH 
ADO ABOUT NOTHING?  A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE” 
 
 Dr. Dennis Roderick is a Lecturer in Psychology and 
Crime and Justice Studies at the University of Massachusetts 
at Dartmouth. He is also a Lecturer in Psychology at Curry 
College.  Dr. Susan Krumholz is an Associate Professor in 
the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the 
Director of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of 
Massachusetts at Dartmouth. She also served as legal counsel 
for the Office of Human Rights in the Massachusetts 
Department of Mental Health.  In their article, Roderick and 




Krumholz argue that therapeutic jurisprudence, (TJ), 
originally conceived as a legal tool in the field of civil 
commitment and mental health law, offers an alternative 
means to aid in the mediation of litigation disputes in the 
criminal justice system. At least one goal of therapeutic 
remediation is a decrease in the rate of recidivism.  
 Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes that legal rules, 
procedures and actors are social forces that intentionally or 
unintentionally produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences in the judicial process. The authors contend 
that the theoretical principles of TJ have been utilized by 
legal scholars, judges, practitioners, social scientists and even 
lawmakers, in the field of criminal justice.  It has been 
employed as a successful “problem-solving technique” or 
healing process designed to mitigate the psychological and 
social harms arising out of the operation of the criminal 
justice system to both the victim and the perpetrator. 
Specifically, the authors explore how TJ provides a study or 
explanation of how legal processes, laws and legal actors can 
have a therapeutic effect or non-therapeutic effect in the 
criminal justice system. 
 Roderick and Krumholz explore the debate between 
social scientists as to an accurate definition of TJ. Then, the 
authors embark upon the study of the validity (accuracy) and 
reliability (consistency) of its theoretical constructs in direct 
application to the criminal justice system. TJ is a social 
sciences theory.  It is a perspective that examines whether the 
criminal justice system has failed the participants by merely 
serving as a vehicle to mete out punishment and vindicate the 
interests of society at large without truly accounting for the 
harm or damage suffered by the victims and the perpetrators 
or the roles of other relevant actors, including judges and 
lawyers, in that process. 
 At least one goal of TJ is to reduce recidivism through 
some form of systematic therapeutic method. Like any 
scientific method, whether aimed at evidentiary admissibility 
or achieving some verifiable result in the criminal justice 
system, it should be subject to empirical verification. 
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However, the authors conclude that major structural reform in 
the criminal justice system is required before any significant 
empirical results could be obtained.   
 The legal system seldom looks at itself critically and 
the viewpoints of social scientists contribute to that 
examination process. Roderick and Krumholz offer a 
theoretical but nonetheless important first step to considering 
new options to the current methodology of prosecution and 
sentencing.  With increased rates of recidivism, the debate is 
certainly worth considering. Whether therapeutic 
jurisprudence offers a scientific method capable of empirical 




What is justice without truth?  What would the law be 
without forensic science?  The articles published in this 
volume provide some insight into these perplexing questions.  
That glimmer of wisdom is the goal of this project. The 
authors and editors welcome your comments and feedback. 
The Roundtable Symposium Law Journal is proud to dedicate 
this volume to the Southern New England School of Law in 
honor of its 25
th
 year celebration. 
